



CYBERSECURITY

# Menaces et méthodologie


Systeme d'Information et automatisme dans le domaine maritime et portuaire

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**AIRBUS**

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# INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) & MARITIME Industry specifics




ICSs are typically mission-critical applications with a high-availability requirement.




Maritime additional requirements:

- Always-on environment
- Strong scheduling / operational constraints.
- environmental constraints.



To move further on :

- More automation – tendency to unmanned ships.
- No accommodation and related cost.
- Less power
- More cargo



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# PORT INFRASTRUCTURE

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Terminal Operations & Management



Automated Gates



Physical Security



Crane Monitoring and Control



Wireless Devices & Tracking




VTS Systems

CYBERSECURITY



# SHIP SYSTEMS

That can and are being hacked



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# Interaction entre le navire et son environnement?

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Navigation au large  
ECDIS

Navigation côtière

Surveillance / maintenance  
systèmes


Localisation

Gestion équipage

Gestion et chargement  
fret


Trajectoire /  
Evitement collision

Détection flottabilité/voie  
d'eau



# SHIPS AND PORT

## ICS weaknesses



-  **Obsolete operating systems**
-  **Old Industrial Processors with no protection**
-  **Lack of cyber security awareness Training**
-  **Lack of cyber security and safety policies**
-  **Networks not segregated**
-  **Lack of access-control to computers and networks**
-  **Unpatched Legacy systems**
-  **Lack of intrusion detection**

# MARITIME CYBER ATTACKS

Is reality



Demonstration made - it is possible to change a vessel's direction -> GPS spoofing.



A hacker caused a floating oil-rig located off the coast of Africa to tilt to one side, thus forcing it to temporarily.



Hackers accessed cyber systems in a port to locate specific containers loaded with illegal drugs and remove them from the port undetected.



Somali pirates employed hackers to access a shipping company's cyber systems to identify vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden with

- valuable cargoes
- minimal on-board security.

# MARITIME CYBER ATTACKS

Even not a target you can be a victim




In the Norwegian energy and oil and gas sector, more than 50 cyber security incidents were detected in 2015.



2017 : Ransomware Petya : cost the Maersk company as much as \$300 million in lost revenue.



March 2018: Svitser revealed in that it has also suffered a significant data breach. 50,000 emails containing private personnel information, auto-forwarded to accounts outside.




More incidents on [maritimecyberalliance.com](http://maritimecyberalliance.com)



## Study 11 UK Ports: Do you intend to deploy any of the following digital solution areas?

- 1. Maintenance, monitoring, analytics, networks, remote management
- 2. VTS/PMIS systems
- 3. Wireless networks
- 4. Standardized Port IT infrastructure and software
- 5. Machinery and automation integration, IoT
- 6. Safety and security, cybersecurity



The answers tend to say that UK ports are ready to invest in cybersecurity

# METHODOLOGY

## Methodology

### QUALIFICATION TESTS

In a virtualized industrial environment based on our Cyber Range, advanced performance tests of selected IDS ICS are performed to qualify the best IDS probe for your business. These tests are run on IDS ICS using the PCAP of your legitimate activity and incorporating malicious scenarios.

### MAPPING SOLUTIONS

Study phase : a comparative analysis based on the requirements criteria specific to your industrial environment. Providing a comparison study with eligible solutions



### SOC ICS – IDS MONITORING

The finale step of our value proposition on the basis of preceding steps is the construction of your OSC ICS. Based on the IDS ICS architecture and coupled with log centralization. Specific use cases to your business will detect threats than can hurt your field business.

### ICS CYBER PROTECTION

On the basis of the design study and the qualification tests, our architects implements the architecture IDS for ICS specific to your environment. These also provide the configuration of IDS to a central log collection to prefigure the next SIEM software that will be a central part of your ICS SOC.

### ICS PROTECTION DESIGN

With the support of our ICS architects and our Cyber Range, a design of ICS architecture of your industrial environment will be created and made at the end of the design study. The Cyber Range makes it possible to validate the relevance and effectiveness of this architecture in the virtual environment and then move on to the implementation stage.

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# CORRELATE IT & ICS, THE NEXT STEP !

## Monitor your ICS



### Services

- Evaluation of cybersecurity maturity
- Cybersecurity training
- Awareness



### Detection & Investigation

- Anomaly detection
- Data lost prevention
- Investigative tool
- Industrial Threat Intel



### Control & Defence

- Integrity control
- Host Hardening
- Protection against malicious programs
- Firewall & intrusion detection
- Application control

## Context

- ❑ 2017 cyber criminals caused major service disruptions around the world.
  - Shadow Brokers (Stolen Data – NSA)
  - WannaCry (May 12th)
  - Petya/NotPetya/Nyetya/Goldeneye
    - Pharmaceutical company Merck, Danish shipping company Maersk, and Russian oil giant Rosnof.
    - Ukrainian infrastructure particularly hard, disrupting utilities like power companies, airports, public transit, and the central bank,

And also : **Bad Rabbit**, Wikileaks CIA Vault 7, Cloudbleed (leak of sensitive data), USA voters (198 Million Voter Records Exposed), Macron Campaign Hack

- ❑ 2018, we can anticipate the trend to become more pronounced
  - Attackers will use machine learning and AI.
  - Supply Chain Attacks to Become Mainstream – service disruption (e.g. Maersk in 2017)
  - File-less and File-light Malware (fewer IoC – harder to track)